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Reply to critics by David Ingram
Before responding to my commentators, I would like to thank each of them for having
taken time out of their busy lives to read a long and at times densely argued book.
I chose them as my interlocutors because their reflections on selected topics had already
served me well in composing my book. I expected quality commentary from them and
have not been disappointed.
Gottfried Schweiger’s research has pioneered new territory in the field of applied
recognition theory, and his comments here and elsewhere have made me more aware of
the complications associated with using recognition as one foundational category (along
with discourse, which he does not discuss) for theorizing the injustices and pathologies
associated with poverty and social marginalization.
In prefacing his comments, Schweiger himself notes several features that seem to
recommend recognition theory as at least a necessary supplement to standard liberal
theories of distributive (in)justice, namely, its attempt to ascertain injustice by appeal to
the ordinary experiences of indignation suffered by those who claim to be victims of
injustice and its understanding that a part of justice concerns the psychology of human
relationships, which is not a good or resource that can be measured and distributed in
any straightforward way. All of this stands in stark contrast to liberalism’s concern with
distributing basic primary goods, resources, and capabilities that individuals need
(taken separately and abstractly as rational agents) according to general principles
that have been constructed on the basis of what are taken to be widely (perhaps
universally) accepted fixed judgements. The important and difficult challenge for
recognition theory, as Schweiger makes clear in his comments, is whether its starting
point in experience suffices to generate a theory of injustice and social pathology apart
from an elitist theory of objective human development and/or a liberal theory of
distributive justice. In other words, does recognition theory’s counter-intuitive
approach to framing poverty as a psychological harm really provide an alternative or
needed supplement to a liberal theory of distributive justice?
Schweiger’s critical engagement with my book centres around two major theoretical
claims I make in chapter one, specifically about the contribution recognition theory
makes to understanding poverty as a form of injustice, and an example that I use to
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illustrate them, which takes up the self-subordination social recognition paradox dis-
cussed by Serene Khader in her critique of microfinance as a tool for empowering
women in the developing world.
The two claims Schweiger questions are that (1) injustices invariably call forth
experiences of misrecognition or lack of recognition in the oppressed and (2) recogni-
tion theory provides at least one (perhaps necessary if not sufficient) reason why their
experiencing misrecognition or lack of recognition is itself an injustice.
Schweiger denies (1) by correctly noting that many victims of injustice, such as
young children and mentally handicapped persons, sometimes do not feel that they are
being actively discriminated against as less important than others (misrecognition) or
that their basic human needs are being ignored (lack of recognition). Indeed, Martha
Nussbaum and Khader herself, writing on adaptive preferences and poor women, have
argued that sometimes normally functioning adults can accept (even affirm) treatment
that observers would say is unjust without feeling disrespect or neglect. These forms of
rationality bias pale in significance to a more general cognitive/education bias: ignor-
ance. As Schweiger notes, most employees do not feel exploited as their wages stagnate
in comparison to the ever inflated compensation of CEOs; likewise few people would
lament the declining quality of their public services as an injustice rooted in structural
coercion of a neo-liberal capitalist economy. Even dependent housewives who justly
complain about their husbands not giving them a sufficient allowance might misidentify
the recognitive injustice they experience as (to use Honneth’s tripartite scheme) simple
deficiency of love rather than as disrespect for their autonomy or failure to give them
what is their proper due as an equal contributor to the household economy. The
appropriate form of recognition needed to resolve this injustice might not be more
loving gifts from husbands but daycare policies that enable women to become inde-
pendent breadwinners outside the home or, at the very least, policies that entitle women
to a portion of their husband’s earnings or to a government-funded income as
a demonstration of society’s esteem for the social value of domestic caretaking.
Of course, another way to describe the situation Schweiger raises–one that I should
have formulated differently when I suggested that all injustices might be accompanied
by experiences of misrecognition or lack of recognition – is to say that not all forms of
misrecognition or lack of recognition are experienced as such by those suffering from
misrecognition (or lack of recognition), however much it might be perceived by others.
Unfortunately, as Schweiger rightly notes, simply saying that oppressed groups are
denied the recognition due them theoretically speaking regardless of their personal
experiences does not save my (or Honneth’s) theory of recognition as an experience-
based supplement to elite liberal theories of distributive justice. In the absence or
misinterpretation of disrespectful experience, recognition theory is now supposed to
enlighten ideologically duped social agents about the real inadequacies of their experi-
ences of relational self-contentment. Furthermore, this recognition-based critique of
ideological delusion serves an emancipatory interest: motivating the oppressed to
radically change their unfulfilling social relationships (e.g., by eliminating domination)
through reforming economic, legal, socio-political, and cultural institutions within
which these relationships are embedded. Furthermore, it follows that recognition theory
must then already have judged the injustice of these institutions by precisely showing
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how they have failed to properly distribute basic rights, resources, opportunities, and
capabilities in proper recognition of the needs of individuals or groups.
If that is so, then it remains to be explained how recognition theory contributes differently
to our understanding of the injustices and pathologies of poverty than a liberal theory of
distributive justice. As Rawls notes, experiences such as self-respect can also be primary goods
whose absence can be correlated with statistical measurements of social pathological beha-
viour and whose measurable presence can be affected by social guarantees of decent, well-
paying jobs, equal opportunity education, safe and healthy neighbourhoods, and adequate
healthcare. If this is right, then self-respect and perhaps othermodalities of recognition can be
influenced (distributed, as it were) by government policy. Likewise, as Schweiger notes (citing
Avishai Margalit), feelings of disrespect (humiliation) would not signal institutional maldis-
tribution of self-respect absent a good reason, which would, in turn, reference the maldis-
tribution of some other good, such as equal access to public services and benefits.
Here it matters little whether we are talking about influencing (distributing) beha-
viour or experience since the two are closely connected. As I argue in chapter two,
poverty knowledge must walk a fine line between treating the poor as passive victims of
structural coercion whose behaviours and experiences can be socially engineered by
government policy in top-down fashion and as active agents whose (at times self-
destructive) choices are entirely free (both voluntary and unconstrained). Any adequate
grasp of the so-called ‘culture of poverty’ that manages to avoid racial stereotyping will
have to begin with the phenomenology of poverty as an experience of marginalization
(social exclusion) and adaptation to a harsh reality.
In sum, I agree with Schweiger that recognition theory’s attempt to explain injustice
experientially, which ostensibly privileges concrete practice and motivated struggle over
abstract normative theory, is overdrawn. In order to function as social criticism and
ideology critique, recognition theory must not only be formulated as an abstract
normative theory but it must be more tightly developed as an institution-based theory
of distributive justice, something that Nancy Fraser and others have suggested as well.
The second claim of mine that Schweiger questions follows from what I have just said
about the need to supplement recognition theory, both as a normative (ideal), teleological
theory of social freedom and agency and as a material theory that concretely relates social
freedom and agency to specific economic, political, legal, social, and cultural institutions that
function both distributionally and relationally. My second claim can be parsed into two
separate claims: (1) a normative theory of recognition can help us to distinguish between
cases of experienced misrecognition or lack of recognition that correlate with injustice and
those that do not and (2) a normative theory of recognition can distinguish between forms of
recognition that are inadequate, even if they are experienced as sufficiently self-affirming, and
those that are fully adequate, even if they are not so experienced.
Schweiger believes that I have not sufficiently explained how to make good on these
two claims, despite my having followed Hegel (and Honneth) in correlating types and
modalities of recognition with the concrete institutional spheres of a modern society
that actualize social freedom. He may be right. Clearly, institutional analysis is essential
for assessing claims to misrecognition and non-recognition. Schweiger notes that the
use of normative recognition theory to distinguish between the racist’s experience of
marginalization and the marginalization experienced by racial minorities must also
address institutional racism, which I discuss in chapters one and two. If we accept, as
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I argue in chapter one, that deliberate discrimination (misrecognition, in Schweiger’s
sense) might not be the sole or primary cause currently sustaining racially disparate
institutional distributions of primary goods, resources, opportunities, and capabilities
and their correlative behavioral/psychological impacts, and we instead assume that
these distributions and impacts are partly or mainly the result of passive lack of
recognition, then, as I argue in chapter one, we may need to remedy this disparity
not by focusing institutional resources on consciousness-raising education about the
evils of racial prejudice but by focusing those resources on more poverty research and
ameliorative policy. Again, the debate over the ‘culture of poverty’ and alleged pathol-
ogies associated with female-headed African American families, which I discuss in
chapter two, is one, I argue, that must attend to the psychological dynamics of
adaptation to institutionalized racism.
Again, Schweiger’s criticism of welfare-state capitalism as a coherent system for realizing
recognition is one that I develop at length in chapter four. Like Schweiger, I question
Honneth’s failure in Freedom’s Right to distinguish capitalist market systems from socialist
market systems and his apparent optimism that the former can be structurally reformed to
fully realize his own recognitive norm of social freedom.1 Capitalism, of course, designates
a comprehensive social system whose various institutions are notoriously conflictual.
However, I am not confident that any system can realize social freedom consistently.
Within any modern, rationally differentiated system, exchange relations that distribute
esteem according to competitive achievement will clash with counter-economic expectations
that distribute esteem according to productive contribution, personal risk and sacrifice, and
support or dependency-based merit. Esteem will clash with democratic and legal equality.
One might therefore privilege the formal legal-political equality that attaches to citizenship
and its institutionalization in a constitutional democracy as the locus where conflicts between
competing recognition orders are resolved, as Habermas seems to suggest. But his own
understanding of democratic social freedom as a publicly recognized, institutional framework
for realizing reconciliation comes up short in his frank appraisal of the unavoidable tendency
towards reification inherent within constitutional democracy. Even a proceduralist paradigm
of on-going discursive reinterpretation cannot dissolve the fixed tension between, for exam-
ple, the strict formal equality attached to the distribution of civil liberties, such as freedom of
speech, and the differential substantive safeguards (limitations on campaign financing, hate
speech ordinances, etc.) of civil rights designed to guarantee equal protection under the law to
the poor andmarginalized.2 Here I am inclined to agree with ToddHedrick’s sober prognosis
1Honneth responds to this criticism in a later book, On the Idea of Socialism, in which he argues that the competitive,
possessive individualism intrinsic to capitalism since its inception is incompatible with realizing the social freedom he
takes to be at the heart of the socialist ideal. I applaud Honneth’s effort to recover the socialist idea for the
contemporary age by dissociating it from its original nineteenth century formulations (economism, determinism, class
dualism). But his own equation of the modern idea of socialism with Deweyan experimentalism and social democracy
lacks sufficient detail to see how it clearly differs from a more socially responsible capitalist order (e.g., of the postwar
Fordist type). For example, he does not defend public ownership of productive capital, perhaps because he closely
associates that scheme with a discredited model of market-free, planned economy. As I argue in World Crisis and
Underdevelopment, private ownership of investment capital is precisely that defining feature of a capitalist economy
that explains why any capitalist market system (however well-regulated and socially responsible) necessarily embeds
relationships of domination that are corrosive to democratic life (Honneth’s socialist embrace of liberty, equality, and
fraternity) as well as environmentally unsustainable. For more on the limits and possibilities of my market socialist
alternative, see my reply to Azmanova.
2D. Ingram, ‘Disputing the Law: Lyotard in our Time: A Forgotten Critic Bears Witness to Unresolvable Injustices,’ Berlin
Journal of Critical Theory, 2/4 (October 2018): 33–54.
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that ironic acceptance of a democratically propelled, constitutional learning process that is
our best hope for incremental ‘progress’ in fuller freedom, rather than robust affirmation of
any existing social freedom, is the most we moderns can aspire to.3 Therefore, in response to
Schweiger’s important question whether competing institutionalized modalities of social
freedom (recognition) oppose each other in theory or in practice, let me just say that the
onlymeaningful way to answer this question is by analysing closely the limits and possibilities
of actual institutional practice, as my discussion of the different limits and possibilities of
capitalist versus socialist markets attests. That doesn’t prevent us from developing empirically
testable, theoretical hypothesis regarding essential (structural or logical) limits on any market
economy, nor does it prevent us from theoretically postulating structural tensions (or contra-
dictions) between anymarket system of social freedom and any genuinely democratic system
that promises anything more than mere universal suffrage.
Schweiger touches on the particular challenge facing my extension of recognition
theory to the global arena. In the introduction I suggest that there is no reason why
some of the recognitive expectations underlying globalized capitalism are not universal.
These expectations no doubt assume a culturally inflected form as well. But the
presence of global labour struggles of remarkably similar focus suggests there is indeed
a global ethos regarding the limits of exploitation. As I argue in chapter five, discourse
theory, which operates at a much higher level of normative abstraction than recognition
theory, provides an important procedural basis for framing our understanding of the
bi-conditional relationship between a deliberative democratic legitimation of law and
institutionally embedded human rights. However, it seems to me that in Habermas’s
more recent genetic account of the moral content of human rights, overlapping ethical
struggles against generalized types of disrespect (misrecognition and lack of recogni-
tion) play a preponderant role as well; and it is this historical experience of indignity
and indignation, rather than a formal deduction of basic rights, that saves a discourse
theory of law from privileging classical liberal rights.
Granting that a phenomenology of struggles for recognition explains the comple-
mentarity of human rights, especially in their institutional (or legal) form, it still
remains a hotly contested question whether recognizing each cosmopolitan citizen as
a person who is entitled to an equal and full enjoyment of human rights means
distributing the resources, opportunities, and capabilities guaranteed to them by
human rights equally instead of differentially (e.g., in a manner more sensitive to socio-
cultural context). Do human rights impose legal duties to provide each person a basic
threshold of goods sufficient for leading a minimally decent and dignified life, compa-
tible with widely varying standards of living and development? This appears to be
Schweiger’s sentiment, when he asserts that women’s struggle for equal rights in
Germany occurred within a national constitutional debate whereby any appeal to
human rights would have been inflected by local experiences and standards. The
alternative is to assert that human rights impose duties to raise all cosmopolitan citizens
to a uniform level of development, commensurate with realizing the principle of equal
legal protection against standard risks to humanity within a global society. In response
to Schweiger’s scepticism about the need for global remedies, I am inclined to think that
3T. Hedrick, Reconciliation and Reification: Freedom’s Semblance of Actuality from Hegel to Contemporary Critical Theory
(Oxford. Oxford University, 2019).
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the latter understanding of human rights, which accords with their aspirational, experi-
ential, and relational nature, is the correct one. Risks to humanity are borne dispro-
portionately by stateless refugees and others who are profoundly vulnerable to climate
change and other global risks. So global–and not merely national or regional – remedies
are required that involve strengthening the international human rights order. Realizing
human rights in this sense would then require drastic alterations in the unsustainable
consumer lifestyles of affluent persons, with the subsequent convergence of all national
and domestic economies towards a maximally sustainable equilibrium point.
Schweiger’s concluding comment that the self-subordination social recognition para-
dox that women in the developing world experience as they seek emancipation by
accessing entrepreneurial opportunities such as microfinance is a general feature of
capitalist society – indeed, perhaps of any society in which recognition of one’s
autonomy (self-respect) clashes with recognition of one’s social contribution (self-
esteem) – is one that I have endorsed in my more recent research on recognition,
adaptive preferences, and constrained choice.4 To take the example of capitalist society,
not just women, the poor, and the marginalized face the paradox of having to choose
between realizing one aspect of their agency (or one modality of their recognition-based
social freedom) over another, but in some sense all people are forced to make this
choice, surrendering control over their choice to be the author of their own life––to live
a life that expresses their authentic sense of self – in favour of earning a living that
provides them with freedom to maximize their consumer power and, if possible,
increase their social esteem and social capital. Again, the frequently discussed tension
between capitalism and democracy can be framed as a conflict between competing
recognition regimes, the former differentially distributing monetized measures of self-
esteem in a way that undermines the latter’s emphasis on securing equal respect of each
citizen’s right to participate fully in a deliberative process of legal self-determination.
Indeed, this paradox of recognition may be central to any market economy whatsoever,
no matter how socially regulated, if, as Rousseau and Arendt famously warned, people
end up abandoning political and active citizenship in deference to pursuing self-esteem
through economic achievement.
Drew Thompson’s impressive research explores the potential of discourse theory, the
other major normative approach informing World Crisis and Underdevelopment, to
supplement recognition theory in guiding immigration policy as it seeks to navigate
between the shoals of human rights and democratic sovereignty.
His prefatory comments about the non-ideal theoretic approach I take to examining
the institutional, above all global economic, impediments to realizing the recognitive
conditions of social freedom for poverty refugees perfectly encapsulates the complex-
ities of my critical methodology. In my opinion, the global capitalist economy is
analogous to a hostile workplace environment, in which vulnerable segments of the
world’s poor are faced with the dilemma of having to abandon one aspect of their
agency (or one dimension of their social freedom) in order to procure another one. Just
as cumulative acts of misrecognition generate a coercive environment for which an
entire institution, not an individual member of it, is corporately liable, so too the
4D. Ingram, ‘When Microcredit Doesn’t Empower Poor Women: Recognition Theory’s Contribution to the Debate over
Adaptive Preferences,’ in G. Schweiger (ed.), Recognition and Poverty (Springer, 2019).
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cumulative acts of an exploitative economic system generate a coercive environment for
which the international legal order as a whole is liable. Victims of the former must leave
their place of livelihood to recover their dignity; victims of the latter must recover their
livelihood by leaving their place of dignity, viz., their familial, communal, and national
base of social freedom. Constrained by poverty, the poor must choose between welfare
agency and social identity agency; they must choose between social esteem as bread-
winners for their families, self-respect as equal rights-bearing citizens of the country in
which they work, and love as caretakers of family members.
Neither cosmopolitan nor communitarian approaches to migration ethics incorpo-
rate this agential dilemma (injustice) into their theorizing. Both depart from an ideal in
which structural coercion does not figure as the background for perfected moral and
legal relationships, whether it be the unconstrained moral freedom of individuals to live
wherever they please – the cosmopolitan perspective adopted by liberal contractarians,
utilitarians, and other ‘open border’ proponents – or the unconstrained moral freedom
of the political community to control its own membership – the communitarian
perspective of nationalists and other ‘closed (restricted) border’ advocates.
Cosmopolitan ethics overlooks the coercive institutional background constraining ‘free-
dom to migrate’ and the importance of stable democratic communities to realizing
social freedom. Communitarian ethics overlooks the complicity of nation states in
maintaining coercive international institutions that constrain the freedom of demo-
cratic nations no less than the freedom of individual citizens.
Shifting our focus from the positive (moral) freedom of individuals (taken abstractly)
and from the negative (legal) freedom of political communities (taken abstractly) to the
social freedom of institutionally cooperating co-partners, it becomes imperative that all
of those subjected to and affected by global institutions should participate as equals (or
in some degree of parity) in constituting and amending their terms of cooperation. It is
in this spirit that I draw upon Habermasian discourse theory to problematize three
institutional dimensions of immigration policy: the metapolitical presuppositions that
frame thinking about national sovereignty, borders, and citizenship; the political pre-
suppositions that frame thinking about national immigration policy; and the judicial
presuppositions that frame migrant claims processing.
Unlike most ideal theories of political justice, discourse theory models a project of
democratic constitutional reform oriented towards greater participatory inclusivity,
equality, and freedom in a manner that refrains from prejudging the content of
decisions unless they impede the realization of deliberative and decisional parity.
When applied to the first dimension of immigration policy, discourse ethics requires
counterfactually reimagining boundaries to accord with a multiplicity of urgent and
competing claims for limited sovereignty and transborder connectedness. It reminds us
that questions regarding the drawing and meaning of national boundaries should never
be regarded as completely settled and that re-opening their status should be sensitive to
public opinion informed by free, inclusive, and egalitarian deliberation. The EU’s
evolving system of ‘disaggregated citizenship’ can be understood as an example (imper-
fectly democratic, to be sure) of this kind of deliberation, as can its attempt (as of yet
unrealized) to propose a method for resettling refugees among its member states that
replaces the Geneva Convention’s state-centric approach. Another example I discuss
includes the fluid discussion (currently suspended) about what the appropriate
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boundaries determining Palestinian and Israeli political units should look like in order
to preserve some degree of national sovereignty combined with supranational rights of
transit and much else. Finally, to take a livelier example, as of this writing, the so-called
‘Brexit’ negotiations revolving around retaining a ‘backstop’ that might preserve
a relatively porous border between EU member-state Ireland and Northern Ireland
(UK) for both goods and persons – as per the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, persons
born in Northern Ireland can claim Irish or UK citizenship or both – continues to find
popular support among those most adversely affected by a hard UK exit from the EU.
One question Thompson poses to my application of discourse theory at the meta-
political level is how it might actually proceed. It’s one thing to conceptualize
a democratic procedure for political secession, annexation, consolidation, power shar-
ing and devolution, and another thing to implement it. The fairest way to implement
a democratic process in these instances of boundary-crossing must be sensitive to
history and context. In the case of Israel and Palestine, the situation is especially fraught
because of a number of legitimate historical imperatives. How one balances the need for
a Jewish sanctuary, which for many Israeli Jews practically requires immigration and
nationalization policies that favour Jews and disfavours Palestinians, with the need to
recognize Palestinian claims to their homelands, which requires eliminating these
policies, cannot be theoretically resolved. Thompson rightly points out that the exclu-
sion of immigrants that might be justifiably exercised by aboriginal peoples who have
a sovereign right to practice their religion freely, which might entail protecting natural
and ancestral spirits from territorial desecration, cannot be as straightforwardly justified
in the case of a multicultural secular democracy like Israel.
As for applying discourse theory to the political dimension of immigration theory,
I propose a principle which is similar in some respects to a principle proposed by Seyla
Benhabib, which requires that immigration policies be rationally acceptable to all
affected parties, or in my formulation, non-rejectable in light of the rationally consid-
ered moral rights and interests of all affected parties. My formulation has the practical
implication of shifting the burden of proof onto citizens of affluent states, modulating
the discourse theoretical principle of reciprocity in an asymmetrical direction.
Thompson is concerned that I have not provided a theory of reasonableness for
racist immigration policies but I make clear my endorsement of Benhabib’s exclusion of
‘race, gender, religion, ethnicity, language community, or sexuality’ as legitimate rea-
sons for restricting immigrants (immigration preferences, especially when applied to
refugees, are a different matter, as are exceptions, noted above, that apply to aboriginal
peoples who exercise the appropriate powers of territorial sovereignty).
Thompson also notes my omission in discussing what, if any, duties migrants have
towards respecting immigration laws. Should only non-desperate immigrants be duty-
bound to fulfilling the legal requirements for entry and residency? It seems that
desperate migrants also have a prima facie duty to fulfill legal requirements. However,
I compare their situation to Jews who forged passports and other documents to escape
Nazi persecution. In the absence of readily accessible and affordable legal remedies that
enable asylum seekers to escape life threatening circumstances in timely fashion,
desperate people have justified recourse to irregular avenues of escape. In a conflict
between duties, the survival of oneself and one’s family must be accorded priority over
adherence to law.
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As for how the law should treat undocumented (or irregular) migrants, I argue
strenuously against criminalizing illegal entry and undocumented residence. I do not
advocate open border policies in deference to the principle of national self-
determination which finds support in the territorial conditions of institutionally secured
social freedom. The enforcement of even unjust immigration policy must sometimes
involve the imposition of sanctions. Fines and even deportation may be appropriate
(especially if the defendant has a serious criminal record). However, my application of
discourse theory to the third dimension of immigration ethics – the judicial processing
of suspected violations – requires that judges take the defendant’s circumstances into
account as well as the harm that deportation would inflict on their (and others’) agency
in applying and interpreting the law. Judges should not abuse their discretion in carving
out new exceptions (a recourse that can normally be justified only when national
immigration policy clearly violates human rights) but they should exercise the legit-
imate discretion they have to compassionately apply the law.
Thompson raises additional points that I would need to address in fleshing out
a discourse- and recognition- theoretic account of immigration ethics. For example, my
account suggests that the best way to safeguard the social freedom of economic (and climate)
refugees is by eliminating the coercive poverty and unsustainable growth of a global capitalist
economy, but the model of economic democracy I propose as a substitute for capitalism (in
chapter four) is, for the time being, a desideratum to be realized in the distant future. In the
meantime, the current refugee crisis calls for reform. No government has an unconditional
duty to admit vast numbers of refugees when doing so might drastically obstruct its duty to
protect the human and domestic rights of its current residents. To relieve this burden
I propose the creation of supranational and international systems of governance (chapters
five and six) that would be empowered to facilitate the resettlement of refugees in a manner
that gives voice to all affected parties. Above all, a discourse theoretic approach should give
refugees equal voice (through representative agencies, such as the UNHCR) in the design of
international resettlement policies and in their own resettlement.
Thompson concludes his commentary by providing an important supplement to my
discourse theoretic treatment of migration. Drawing from my recognition theoretic
account of social freedom, he notes that any adequate ethics of immigration will have to
include a theory about how resettled migrants should be socially and politically
integrated in a manner that fully respects their and their host community’s agency.
Such a theory must be sensitive to the full costs of resettlement (economic and non-
economic), for which only inclusive and impartial dialog can guide the fair distribution
of burdens and benefits. In this respect, discourse theory does not specify the precise
procedures instituting participatory parity but reminds us that no legitimate integration
can exclude the reasonable interests of any affected party.
Albena Azmanova’s most original and provocative studies of capitalism provide
a useful framework for sharpening my thesis about capitalism as a coercive system of
domination whose evils go beyond maldistribution of wealth, impoverishment, and
unsustainability. I find her tripartite breakdown of domination into relational, struc-
tural, and systematic important for discussing any form of political economy, capitalist
or non-capitalist, and her elaboration of it has made me reconsider whether the model
of economic democracy I appropriate from David Schweickart as an alternative to
capitalism manages to eliminate or sufficiently mitigate these forms of domination.
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Azmanova and I agree that capitalism implicates all three forms of domination. At
the essential core of a capitalist system is a mechanism of labour exploitation that is
‘legitimized’ through voluntary wage contracts in which threats backed by economic
and legal sanctions are necessarily leveraged to the advantage of employers. In contrast
to Honneth’s ethical analysis of capitalist forms of exchange and cooperation in
Freedom’s Right, she and I are sceptical that these forms can adequately meet
a threshold of non-exploitation and mutual benefit sufficient to satisfy the conditions
of social freedom that he and I endorse regarding institutional recognition of socially
esteem-worthy contribution.
This relational form of domination, which is structurally necessitated by the rules of
capitalist competition and capital accumulation, finds a parallel at the global level.
Developing nations located at the periphery of a global network of exchange are
constrained to supply developed nations located in the technological industrial core
with raw resources and cheap labour in a way that perpetuates a one-sided relationship
of dependency and domination.
Relational domination within a capitalist system can be increased or diminished –
never eliminated – by altering the rules of exchange to diminish exploitation and
aggregate flows of wealth to the core, coupled with reductions in surplus environmental
degradation and resource depletion in the periphery. However, the political power that
lies behind the rules structuring exchange is concentrated in the hands of a corporate
capitalist class and the governments of countries located at the core. I discuss one aspect
of this structural domination in my treatment of the US government exercising near-
imperial hegemony over the global capitalist economy and its subsidiary international
economic multilaterals, the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary
fund.
In response to my thought experiment about a free trade capitalist economy in
a state of nature, free from the political distortions of structural power, Azmanova
remarks that even a perfectly fair system of exchange between individuals or between
nations based on the competitive pursuit of profit would still harbour systemic dom-
ination, if nothing else. Simply redistributing capital assets and liabilities among
economic agents would not eliminate the domination of the entire system over anyone
who participates in it.
Azmanova’s concern recalls Marx’s own conviction that true social freedom cannot
be achieved by redistributing wealth. As we shall see, her concern also echoes another
belief of Marx, held by many first-generation critical theorists, that socializing the
means of production will not eliminate the domination of competitive market forces
over our lives. As we know, Marx conceives the elimination of competitive markets as
a prerequisite for even undeveloped socialism; and he conceives the elimination of the
legal domination necessary for maintaining market exchanges and accumulations as
a prerequisite for a fully realized communism, which inscribes on its banner: ‘From
each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.’
It is at this point in her commentary that Azmanova suggests that I may have
underestimated the degree to which systemic domination structures not only capitalism
but my alternative to capitalism: democratically regulated, market-based socialism.
Before addressing this concern, I would like to briefly respond to two other points
she raises in this regard. The first point is that my analysis of global capitalism focuses
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too much on international domination and not enough on domination within subna-
tional territorial units and between (and across) them. If I were to revisit this topic
today, I would spend more time discussing the dynamics of direct investment and
finance capital than I have here. What I do say in this regard is that financialized
capitalism (to use Fraser’s term) has radically intensified the process of capital accu-
mulation, generating greater disparities in wealth accumulation between the investor
class and the rest of us and inducing global debt risks and new management and
legitimation crises that have crippled national governments and created distrust of
democratic institutions from both the Left and the Right.
Another peculiarity of what she takes to be my agent-centred approach to power that
she believes prevents me from fully perceiving social domination is my endorsement of
Iris Young’s social connectedness model of social responsibility for structural injustice.
If I understand Azmanova correctly here, the social connection model still presumes
that agents have power to reduce systemic domination through political reform of rules
that frame isolated aspects of structural domination (e.g., global sweatshops and the
retail apparel industry). If what she is saying here is that piecemeal political reform will
not eliminate capitalism as a system of domination, then we are in agreement. But then
I fail to see how belief in agent-powered reform ‘obscures the dynamics of domination
that are sourced from the very practices of the competitive production of profit.’ Of
course, reformism without some ironic awareness of the infinite struggle required to
reduce domination in all its forms (including that embedded in the competitive
production of profit) can obscure the tragic moral downsides associated with any
productivist economic paradigm.
This takes me to Azmanova’s central charge that my desire to achieve a global socio-
economic order as (in my own words) a ‘voluntary social contract between nations and
persons’ (212) cannot be realized without eliminating the ‘competitive nature of
economic practice as well as the productivist nature of work.’ She may be right. But
if she is, then I doubt whether any feasible alternative to capitalism can realize such
a voluntary social contract.
Azmanova understands capitalism to be a social formation that is irreducible to any
of its structuring institutions. For her, capitalism is rather a social system, ‘constituted
by the dynamic competitive pursuit of profit which permeates actors’ social existence
beyond their engagement in the economic process of commodity production.’ This bold
thought recalls what many first-generation critical theorists writing in the forties and
fifties suggested when they asserted that modern economic systems, ranging from the
democratic welfare state to bureaucratic socialism, had managed to solve capitalism’s
structural crisis tendencies. By implementing state planning and severely regulating the
role of capital and labour markets, they came close to eliminating what, for Marx, was
one of the necessary features of capitalism that explains its inherent inability to meet the
basic needs of the proletariat. However, according to these critical theorists, the severe
regulation of capital and labour markets – indeed, the very elimination of productive
private property itself – did not eliminate labour exploitation. On the contrary, they
believed that a system of capital accumulation based on labour exploitation permeated
all modern economic systems, which they accordingly characterized as a form of ‘state
capitalism,’ to cite Friedrich Pollock. More importantly, they believed that even under
socialism, the rational imperative to amass capital in competition with other states – or
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even for the sake of promoting growth as an end in itself – required rational manage-
ment of labour and consumption that intensified exploitation and commodification.
The ‘performance principle,’ in Marcuse’s words, would still dominate the lives of
persons, no matter what social position they occupied in the social system. Today,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United (2010) stands as irrefutable proof of
the penetration of capitalism’s logic of productivism in the court’s understanding of
democratic politics and free speech.5
So, I agree with Azmanova, Nancy Fraser, and many others that capitalism is more
than the sum of its institutional parts, which in any case cannot be reduced to
competitive economic markets in capital, labour, commodities, and services. That
said, my criticism of capitalism in World Crisis and Underdevelopment was primarily
focused on structural rather than systemic domination for practical, economic reasons,
pertaining to the imperative to reduce global poverty while at the same time respecting
the limits to growth, in general.
In my opinion, the lessons learned from the collapse of bureaucratic socialism and
the collapse of laissez-faire capitalism are, first, that neither unregulated market econo-
mies nor government planned economies are efficient on their own; and second, that
market systems can be coupled with different systems of property ownership, including
one whose public ownership and democratic regulation of productive/capital assets
structurally inclines towards less domination, commodification, consumerism, and
growth. However, if a logic of competitive productivism is intrinsic to any competitive
market economy, then Azmanova’s assessment of democratic market socialism as
perpetuating systemic domination in a different (perhaps milder) form will be correct.
My acknowledgement and subsequent neglect of this shortfall in my discussion of social
freedom simply reflects my informed judgement, shared by Habermas among others,
that important parts of our economic lives cannot be subjected to democratic control
without serious loss of other dimensions of social freedom. This is as much to say,
echoing what I said in my response to Schweiger, that social agents in modern societies
must contend with actualizing whatever freedom they can by establishing a felicitous
balance between the competing recognition orders they live within.
To be sure, Honneth is right to note (against Habermas) that market systems
comprise normative recognition orders that mark a progressive advance in social free-
dom over both pre-and post-market economies. What he neglects to sufficiently
emphasize is the extent to which such systems function differently under different
property relations and different economic recognition orders. However, even he recog-
nizes that Post-Fordist neoliberal capitalist markets have eviscerated much of the ethical
expectations of the older forms of capitalism. Neither employees nor employers feel as
strongly obligated to one another or to work and vocational duties associated with
company loyalty and patriotic solidarity as they perhaps once did during the postwar
boom of the fifties and sixties. And, of course, the Fordist model of accumulation was
most definitely marked by intense systemic domination, as first-generation critical
theorists never ceased to remind us.
But that doesn’t settle the question about what the best alternative to today’s neo-
liberal financial capitalism might be. For reasons that I have explained in chapter four,
5See my essay, ‘Disputing the Law.’
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a market socialist economy populated by worker managed, publicly owned firms (which
following Schweickart I call Economic Democracy) does not have the same growth
imperatives or suffer from the same tendencies towards relational and structural
domination as capitalism, even if it does not eliminate systemic domination as such.
Schweickart presents compelling arguments, which I cannot summarize here, to show
why the tendency towards commodification, social reification, competition, and growth
would be less pronounced under Economic Democracy. Most importantly, the core
form underwriting the capitalist form of relational domination, the wage contract,
would be virtually eliminated. In other words, only markets in goods and services
would be permitted, and the motivation for engaging in practices of competitive
accumulation would likely be muted once workers were finally given control over the
pace and duration of their labour relative to maintaining (rather than expanding) their
company’s market share.
Interestingly, given its propensity towards stasis, Schweickart recognizes the need to
qualify Economic Democracy with a bit of capitalism. He recommends supplementing
Economic Democracy with entrepreneurial incentives, such as permitting innovative
ventures that might be operated as privately owned businesses employing wage labour
for the initial twenty years or so of their existence. There are other qualifications, too
detailed to be explained here, that include temporary forms of national protectionism
and compensatory disbursement of tariff revenues back to developing nations that
could be used to raise wage levels in those countries. Because investment capital
would be generated from taxing the use of publicly owned productive assets, the
domination of finance capital would be eliminated (only consumer credit unions
would be permitted) and investment capital would be dispersed to regions on a per
capita (or needs-calibrated) basis, thereby compensating for the kind of uneven devel-
opment that constrains un-and underemployed workers to uproot themselves from
their communal bases of social freedom.
I conclude chapter four with a remark about the limits of Economic Democracy
which in some degree concedes Azmanova’s criticism of that model:
Infusing stakeholder business ethics with discourse ethics might not solve all problems
associated with a market economy but it would mitigate them better than reformed
capitalism. A just distribution of the burdens and benefits attached to the creation of
a sustainable global economy will require that all parties to the social contract shift from
a one-sided focus on maximizing personal gains – which, when considered apart from its
legitimating ethos, appears to be the natural law underwriting any market system, capitalist
or socialist – to a broader focus on the common good, with a preference for solutions that
maximize the condition of the worst off (and possibly require sacrifices on the part of the
better off) (World Crisis p. 218, my stress).
This passage reaffirms the importance of submitting a substantial portion of a market
economy to global democratic control in the long run, guided by discourse ethical
principles enjoining the voluntary consent of all affected parties to terms of cooperation
that they are rationally convinced will work to the best advantage of everyone. Here,
Azmanova’s concluding comment that ‘eliminating coercion from our economic lives
might also need constraint on democracy – just like, at the very inception of European
liberal democracies, the core principles of liberalism were placed beyond the decisional
power of democratic publics’ strikes me as the wrong note to strike in our
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contemporary context. For, although few would question the constitutional entrench-
ment of individuals’ basic human rights as a safeguard against majoritarian tyranny
(such as today’s fascist populism, with its anti-immigrant and anti-global protection-
ism), many – including, I’m sure, Azmanova – would question the libertarian immu-
nization of private wealth and capitalist markets against democratic intervention, not to
mention the subsumption of democratic politics under the logic of a productivist
exchange economy.
My understanding of the connection between democracy and human rights has
benefited enormously from my many discussions with Fr. Willy Moka-Mubelo, who
has written what, in my opinion, is the most comprehensive discussion of Habermas’s
theory of human rights and one, moreover, that deftly manages to relate the abstract
arguments of that thinker to the realities confronting African legal theorists.
Moka-Mubelo’s insistence on the need to reconcile pluralism and contextualism in
justifying and applying human rights with universalism in understanding the core
meaning of human rights agrees with one vital strand of my argument. That argument
is motivated by a number of interrelated concerns: navigating the relationship between
moral and legal conceptions of human rights; avoiding philosophical approaches that
truncate or inflate the legitimate functions human rights serve; distinguishing interac-
tional and institutional applications of human rights; defending the special role that
human rights play in the discourse of development, agency, and social freedom;
expanding the addressees of human rights beyond states to include other actors, and
establishing what kind of interdependency can be said to obtain between human rights
and democracy.
Moka-Mubelo begins his commentary by rightly emphasizing my motivation for
writing on human rights. In my opinion, human rights carve out a language of powerful
duties that institutions have towards respecting and protecting the welfare of indivi-
duals. Furthermore, these duties are individually actionable, and universal; viz., inde-
pendent of the actual practices, functions, rights and duties of mundane forms of social
cooperation and social freedom. Social contractarian duties that can be fairly negotiated
among local producers and consumers, e.g., regarding the permission of energy-
consuming entities to emit carbon when bound by enforceable caps, might not be
negotiable if they endanger the human rights of individuals and groups (such as island
nations) to survive at all. Human rights are not unconditional trumps, but they typically
claim a priority over other rights and duties, and so can normally only be overridden
under certain exceptional circumstances. In the minds of many theorists, and in the
practice of human rights enforcement, human rights to material welfare typically weigh
less than human rights to bodily integrity and freedom in the face of active physical
threats by others; I argue that this way of thinking is wrong.
In order to make this argument we must first clarify the ambiguous status of human
rights themselves. I argue that legal and moral conceptions of human rights are
irreducibly distinct but that one aspect of the moral conception, in particular the
concept of human dignity, serves an important formal role in highlighting the equal,
elevated legal status of individual persons in comparison to groups and corporations,
which are also beneficiaries of certain human rights protection. Allen Buchanan, who
persuasively argues that many legal human rights are tailored to protecting public goods
whose moral justification cannot consist in protecting the capabilities, interests, and
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dignity of individuals qua individuals – the target of moral human rights – concedes
this point, and argues (as does Habermas) that human dignity must essentially refer to
a species-potential that finds expression in rational (discursive) accountability.
However, as against Rainer Forst and K-O Apel, who derive human rights from
a single moral foundation in discursive accountability (in tandem with other empirical
and historical facts about human functioning), I agree with Habermas, Nickel,
Buchanan and many others who argue that legal human rights do not mirror moral
human rights in their functioning (e.g., they do not derive from a moral duty of
individuals to justify their normative commitments to others) and that their moral
grounds cannot be reduced to a single set of moral reasons. The fact that humanitarian
laws proscribing genocide and ethnic cleansing clearly function to protect groups rather
than individuals qua individuals, however, does not obscure the fact that some legal
human rights, especially those falling under the compulsory and peremptory category of
jus cogens, such as prohibitions against torture, slavery, and the like, do largely mirror
moral human rights in directly protecting individuals qua individuals. Finally, in
agreement with Moka-Mubelo, I argue that legal human rights find their moral
justification politically (as Rawls puts it) in an overlapping consensus among different
comprehensive beliefs, as well as discursively (as Habermas puts it) in a rational
consensus based on universal interests and human practicalities.
If we adopt my non-reductive, pluralistic account of human rights, then we avoid the
tendency towards theoretically truncating or inflating an acceptable list of human
rights. Contrary to James Griffin, we can allow that groups and not just individuals
can be appropriate designees of human rights (this means that conflicts between group-
ascribed and individual-ascribed human rights cannot be ruled out, as evidenced by the
right to development, which applies to nations, and the right of a national minority to
democratically protect its culture). At the same time, the functional and practical
prerequisites for legal enforcement rule out inflating human rights to include
a human right to ‘maximal healthcare’ as stipulated in the ICESCR.
In addition to pluralizing and contextualizing the moral, functional, and practical
rationales underlying human rights, my approach also expands the addressees of
human rights. Borrowing Thomas Pogge’s and Henry Shue’s distinction between
interactional and institutional human rights applications, I argue that institutions that
seriously risk grave human rights shortfalls through their normal legal functioning,
such as the WTO’s prohibition against producing cheap generic drugs in violation of
TRIPS patent and licencing codes, or the IMF’s stipulation of loan conditions that force
governments to privatize goods (such as water) and social services (healthcare), can
violate the non-regression clauses contained in human rights treaties. Importantly, as
Cristina Lafont has argued, under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, states can
appeal to their sovereign right to implement international human rights duties against
global economic multilaterals. This logic can be extended to including transnational
companies as addressees of institutional, and not merely criminal (or illegal) interac-
tional, human rights liability. Going beyond implementing voluntary social responsi-
bility codes for conducting business in accord with human rights to imposing legally
binding human rights duties would help strengthen the enforcement of human rights
targeting ecological integrity and welfare.
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The final piece in my account of human rights addresses the problem of institutio-
nalizing a democratically legitimate, international human rights regime that enables the
context-sensitive application of universal human rights, on one side, along with the
constitutionally limited international enforcement of human rights, on the other.
Without going into detail, If we assume that the UN Charter represents a compulsory
constitution rather than a voluntary super-treaty, and if we further accept
a hierarchical, monistic account of law (following Kelsen’s logic), then we can under-
stand human rights as abstract placeholders that authorize concrete, contextual applica-
tions in national legislatures and courts. This stepwise, non-deterministic generation of
plural human rights interpretations through descending democratic iterations guaran-
tees the democratic legitimacy of human rights in an ecological or symbiotic sense, to
use Buchanan’s phrase. In other words, the UN, now understood as the institutional
pinnacle of international law, authorizes the legal systems of democratic states (their
rights and duties as sovereign nations), just as these states discursively legitimate
international treaties in their own domestic legislation.
I argue that the legitimation of international human rights law requires more than
this. In order to avoid allowing state governments to voluntarily opt out of human
rights treaties, I follow Habermas in recommending that the UN Charter undergo an
additional process of constitutionalization in which the General Assembly assumes the
form of a bicameral, quasi-legislative body (or constitutional assembly representing
both nations and delegates reflecting the cosmopolitan interests of humanity). In
conjunction with this constitutional reform, the executive body responsible for enfor-
cing human rights, the Security Council, would have to be restructured and, most
important of all, an international constitutional court would have to be set in place to
adjudicate (conflicting) human rights claims and exercise review over Security Council
decisions, whose sanctions have at times resulted in gross human rights violations of
their own.
An international constitutional court at the pinnacle of an international human
rights order could be configured in a way to pluralize (decentralize) the process of
review and make it responsive to local democratic concerns. A fine balance would have
to be struck between centralization of authority within a hierarchical system, which is
necessary to mitigate the tendency towards legal fragmentation and forum shopping
attendant upon a heterarchical or pluralistic legal order, and decentralization of
authority that responds to local democratic units. Many other checks and balances
would have to be introduced as well to ensure that the incorporation of higher-level
human rights-regarding decisions into lower level constitutional regimes would not
impose retrogressive restrictions or be done without democratic approval.
The constitutionalization of international law is not idle utopian fantasy; it is gradually
happening. Something like constitutional review has begun to check the power of the
Security Council (see the Kadi case). Moka-Mobelo notes, as well, my opinion that the
Responsibility to Protect principle (R2P), even in its final watered-down formulation,
effectively redefines the concept of national sovereignty as a power authorized by interna-
tional human rights law. Sadly, as events in Libya and now Yemen show, not all interven-
tions undertaken in the name of R2P are, in fact, undertaken while being responsible.
The possibility for realizing this ambitious scheme of global governance depends on
extending feelings of solidarity in a cosmopolitan direction – something that neither
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Honneth’s nor Habermas’s respective theories are particularly well equipped to do.
Even solidarity with victims of human rights violations presupposes, at the very least,
some sense that human rights and cosmopolitan recognition are not only rationally
possible but affectively desirable. The tension between individual and group-based
human rights, highlighted by the Asian values debate over the right to development,
forces us to re-examine the compatibility of comprehensive religious traditions that
motivate sacrifices for the greater good with liberal democratic individualism and the
critical challenge that democratic questioning poses to absolute authority of any kind.
My concluding chapter attempts to mitigate the apparent conflict between secular
human rights individualism and religion by suggesting how religions must accommo-
date themselves to risky democratic politics in realizing their own social justice agendas.
I remain optimistic that this protracted education in civility and public reason is both
possible and necessary, if liberal democracy is not to devolve into a contest of wills
pitting hostile, selfish interests against each other.
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